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NOTES AND REVIEWS 
The Myth of Sisyphus and The Stranger: 
Two Portraits of the Young Camus 
Speaking of The Stranger, Jean-Paul Sartre observed in 1947 that "in The 
Myth of Sisyphus, which appeared a few months later, Camus provided us with a 
precise commentary upon his work."1 And certainly the absurd reasoning 
developed at length in that essay seems to speak directly to the strange 
indifference of Meursault and his final happy acceptance of a world without 
meaning. Sartre's view, however, has not found much acceptance among 
contemporary critics, who justly mark the difference between creative and 
philosophical truth.2 That said, I would like to propose here that, in one sense, 
novel and essay are indeed commentaries on one another. It is that both are 
concerned with the epistemology of the human condition, with the changes that 
occur in man's perception of himself, his life, and his world as the individual 
process of existence runs its course. While The Myth presents Camus's 
development of absurdism as a raisonnement, that is, as a line of argument, the 
novel dramatizes Meursault's journey toward the epiphany which, on the eve of 
his execution, enables him to see clearly for the first time. 
The Myth offers a sudden insight into a life whose only order is mechanical 
and artificial. This order is imposed by man himself on an experience otherwise 
gratuitous. To see through it is to begin to live thoughtfully: "Weariness comes 
at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at the same time it inaugurates 
the impulse of consciousness."3 The essay develops at some length the 
consequences of this newly conscious existence. One begins, Camus believes, by 
understanding the world's indifference and also the human desire for reason. If 
the terms of this dialectic are violated by neither the leap of faith nor by suicide, 
then man lives in the absurd, that is, in truth. And if he so persists, he is 
rewarded by a sense of freedom, by the impulse to revolt, by the life force of 
passion. 
For absurd man, then, life has three stages. The theatricality of a daily 
routine ends with the realization that conventional wisdoms are invalidated by 
existence's ultimate meaninglessness. The feeling of absurdity which follows 
responds to the misproportion between the demands of consciousness for order 
and a confronting reality that offers none. But this misproportion, Camus 
argues, should not cause despair, but rather liberate man to enjoy the life given 
him unasked: ". . . completely turned toward death (taken here as the most 
obvious absurdity), the absurd man feels released from everything outside that 
passionate attention crystallizing in him" (pp. 43-44). Absurdity thus frees man 
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to grasp the whole of his life as a process completed in itself, since it lies outside 
any notion of universal justice. Camus in this way derives a new meaning from 
the familiar irony of nascentes morimur. For death, though not in any Christian 
sense, releases man to live. 
The Myth goes on, of course, to explore some patterns of living which exploit 
most successfully an existence whose value is itself. Camus's concern here for an 
ethic of quantity finds no substantial reflection in The Stranger. Nor does 
Meursault resemble the conqueror. Don Juan, or the artist, those absurd types 
to whom the essay pays so much attention. But the epistemology of absurdism 
developed therein, a process of awareness undoubtedly parallel to Camus's 
personal experience, gives the novel its peculiar structure. 
For all its superficial clarity, the first section of The Stranger puzzles and 
confuses. The events narrated are clear enough, but, presented with a first 
person narrative, we wonder why and when the narrator is telling his story. The 
use of present and passé composé verbs suggests a diary, but diary style is 
otherwise absent. The convention of first person narrative generally includes 
some information about the speaker, his purpose in writing, and the audience he 
addresses, even when, as in Notes from Underground, such indications deny the 
attempt to communicate itself. In The Stranger we are certain about what has 
happened, but uncertain about why we have been so informed. Why begin with 
the receipt of the telegram? Why end with the murder of the Arab? Here is a 
succession of events that lack what Aristotle calls mythos, the plot that imparts 
causality to experience's raw data. What Camus here presents is in fact a slice of 
the daily routine, devoid of intention and plot as it must be, a procession of 
events linked only by chronology. Event succeeds event, perception replaces 
perception, without any values by which the process may be interpreted. 
Thus reproducing the daily routine's automatism has posed two insoluble 
technical problems for Camus. These are connected with the process of 
verbalization itself. First, the narrator, as Fitch has labored to show, must be 
placed in the present, looking back at this sequence of events. This tranche of 
experience, of course, has significance only because of what happened at the 
trial, where Meursault is convicted more for his mother's death in the asylum 
than for the Arab's on the beach. The narrator's viewpoint presupposes 
reflection and analysis. But Part I represents Meursault's apprehension of life 
before he is forced to assign it value and meaning. Second, by translating 
Meursault's consciousness (preconsciousness?) into language, Camus alters its 
character. Speech is an act of will, but the Meursault of Part I is someone 
without the will to speak. Finally, of course, the slicing of Meursault's experience, 
giving it a beginning and an end, confers a value on those events that destroys 
their significance as they were lived, without thought about a future that would 
judge and order them. 
At this stage Meursault is hardly a stranger to society. He follows accepted 
forms, like work and ritual, as closely as he can. He accepts relationships with 
others. He takes some joy in what life has to offer. He is, as he maintains before 
the trial, just like everybody else. But Meursault is at this time a stranger in one 
important sense. Like others, he is a stranger to his own existence. He is more 
an instrument than an actor. He feels but does not reflect. The daily routine, 
after all, does not demand otherwise. Much that happens is all the same to him. 
He shows no capacity for emotion. In this humble acquiescence to what we 
consider everyday living, Meursault is like most of us. The examined life may 
well be the only life worth living, but the world seldom calls upon us to 
penetrate the opacity of our own experience. 
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Meursault, however, is elected to penetrate that experience by a bizarre and 
ultimately inexplicable series of events. Why does he pull the trigger? And why 
then does he fire four more shots into the Arab's lifeless form? The novel offers 
an unsatisfactory answer to the first of these questions (it is that the sun itself 
made Meursault fire) and no answer to the second. But these are valid questions 
only if the hero's portrait is ethically motivated, if he is to be seen as the 
champion of truth. Camus's disregard for these issues suggests otherwise. The 
murder figures simply as the given event that permits Meursault to understand 
himself and the human condition. The process of justice, as Champigny points 
out, reduces to absurdity the theatricality of society, which attempts to impose 
the mythos of causality on what happens.4 And so the events of Part I become the 
elements of a plot. We know there is no connection between Meursault's 
behavior at his mother's funeral and his shooting of the Arab. But the 
prosecution's attempt to establish one betrays the very human need for a mythos, 
for a connection between character and motive and between motive and action. 
Upon the unorder of Part I is imposed a misorder that the reader and 
Meursault as well must reject. Camus thus makes us feel the difference between 
the world as experienced and the world as men would conceive it. Meursault is 
jerked from his automatism as he is faced with a human order that is no more 
than a fatuous theatricality. He begins to live in the absurd. As in The Myth, 
however, it is death that finally liberates him to live. 
For Meursault the trial and its consequences reveal death as the central fact 
of the human condition. Meursault in this way finds his sentence not an exile 
from human society, but the key to understanding his full involvement in the life 
of his fellow condemned. Appropriately, it is in prison that Meursault becomes 
the narrator of his own experience as he feels the need, served by words, of 
understanding what has happened and also the desire to communicate that 
understanding to others. He has the right now to speak, for he has become once 
again like everyone else. He is the representative of a human race sentenced 
without real cause to die. As he sees it, death orders life, conferring on all 
actions a perfect equivalence and on disparate destinies the same finale. But he 
does not despair. In The Myth Camus explains his rejection of solutions like the 
Christian to human life: "they relieve me of the weight of my own life, and yet I 
must carry it alone" (p. 41). At the end of the novel Meursault grasps the 
perfected destiny that is his. He discovers what he calls "the benign indifference 
of the universe," that is the cosmic meaninglessness which enables man to live his 
life as his own.5 Like Aeschylus's Cassandra, he recognizes the inevitability of his 
destiny and opens himself freely to it. Unlike Cassandra, however, he finds in 
that inevitability a happiness that overcomes all feelings of loss. In the shadow of 
death, he feels the urge to live, even if life at this point means only the memory 
of what has been lived. The Stranger and The Myth both propose a world without 
meaning in which death ends existence. Both works, the novel perhaps more 
dramatically, reject suicide as a solution to the dilemma posed by 
meaninglessness and mortality. Essay and novel trace instead a process of 
awareness that culminates in a paradoxical truth: that only in the shadow of 
annihilation can man discover his freedom, his passion, and, most of all, the 
grandeur of self-possession. 
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